Evidence Rating for Outcomes
Crime & Delinquency | Public Order Offenses (Law) |
Crime & Delinquency | Public Order Offenses |
Crime & Delinquency | Public Order Offenses (Punitive Sanctions) |
Date:
These deterrence strategies are formal legal and administrative prevention and control tactics designed to prevent the occurrence of corporate crime. Strategies could include laws, regulatory policies, or punitive sanctions. The practice is rated No Effects for reducing individual- and company-level corporate crime.
Program Goals
Corporate crime deterrence strategies are formal legal and administrative prevention and control tactics designed to prevent the occurrence of corporate crime. Corporate crime is defined as conduct by a corporation or an employee acting on behalf of the corporation that is punishable by law (Braithwaite 1984).
Corporate crime can include a wide array of illegal activities that are criminally, civilly, and administratively proscribed and may be undertaken by managers, employees, or the corporation as a way to meet organizational goals. Corporate crime can typically be distinguished from white-collar crime, by determining the use of resources and the party that gains from the offense. The use of organizational resources and organizational gains is typically indicative of corporate crime. White-collar crimes generally include offenses in which the gain is personal, not organizational.
For this review, corporate crime offenses can include offenses in the following categories: administrative noncompliance, environmental violations, financial violations, labor violations, manufacturing violations, and/or unfair trade practices. Each may take many forms. For instance, unfair trade practices can include monopolization, price-fixing, unfair advertising, as well as price discrimination. A key feature of corporate crime offending is the complexity of the crime. While there are exceptions to this, many corporate crime offenses involve multiple interconnected actors and organizations, occur over a long period of time, and entail manipulating companies and billions of dollars (Simpson et al. 2014).
Practice Components
Interventions or strategies targeting corporate crime are typically focused on legal restraints, including laws or regulatory policies. Laws educate the public and corporations about appropriate behavior and dictate the punishments, should wrongdoings occur. Violations of laws can prompt official reaction (filing a case, prosecution, conviction) and/or the application of sanctions.
Alternatively, regulatory policies set guidelines for what firms can and cannot do and set guidelines for behavior. If an organization fails to meet regulatory standards, administrative and civil sanctions may be brought against the organization. Regulatory sanctions occur outside of the criminal justice system and may be handled by administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission).
Practice Theory
Corporate crime deterrence is grounded in the deterrence theory. The deterrence theory posits that fear of detection, as well as certainty of severe sanctions for offending, will promote compliance. Corporate laws and regulatory policies that work to prevent corporate crime do so through prevention and deterrence.
Laws can prevent crime by telling people and corporations which behaviors are acceptable or prohibited. Laws can also deter crime by increasing the informal monitoring of behaviors. In other words, when individuals know that a certain behavior is illegal they may be more likely to report it.
Regulatory policies, such as inspections and warning letters, can educate corporations by identifying their areas of noncompliance. The official sanctions that result from law violations and regulatory policy violations can deter those tempted to commit a crime because of the fear of apprehension. Finally, official sanctions and regulatory actions also increase the risk of reputational damage, which can serve as a powerful deterrence for companies.
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Crime & Delinquency | Public Order Offenses (Law)
Simpson and colleagues (2014) analyzed the deterrent effect of laws on corporate-level offending. Aggregating the results of five cross-sectional studies, the authors found a nonsignificant deterrent effect of laws on company-level offending, meaning that laws did not reduce measures of corporate crime at the company level. |
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Crime & Delinquency | Public Order Offenses
Simpson and colleagues (2014) analyzed the deterrent effect of regulatory policies on corporate-level offending. Through aggregating the results of 18 cross-sectional studies, the authors found that regulatory policies did not impact company-level offending. |
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Crime & Delinquency | Public Order Offenses (Punitive Sanctions)
Simpson and colleagues (2014) analyzed the deterrent effect of punitive sanctions on corporate-level offending. When aggregating the results of 10 cross-sectional studies, the authors found that punitive sanctions did not significantly impact measures of corporate crime at the company level. |
Literature Coverage Dates | Number of Studies | Number of Study Participants | |
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Meta Analysis 1 | 1972-2012 | 106 | 0 |
Simpson and colleagues (2014) reviewed studies that examined the impact of formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategies on the occurrence of corporate crime. Interventions could include any form of legal intervention that could impact the decision making of corporations and thus aim to prevent corporate crime. Interventions were limited to examining the impact of these interventions on noncompliance with outcomes, including a variety of corporate illegal behaviors; these outcomes could reflect actual behavior or behavioral intentions as reported by respondents.
A comprehensive search of bibliographic databases, bibliographies of previous meta-analyses, and literature reviews was conducted. Both published and unpublished reports were included in the search. Inclusion depended on the following five criteria:
- The study was an evaluation of a corporate crime prevention/control strategy in the legal or administrative domains.
- The study included a comparison group (or pre-intervention comparison period in the case of pre–post studies) that did not receive the treatment. Studies could include experimental, quasi-experimental, or pre–post evaluations.
- The study reported on at least one crime/misconduct outcome, which could include a wide range of criminal behaviors, regulatory violations, or civil violations.
- The study was written in English.
- The study was published before 2012.
The search yielded 262 articles that were eligible and coded; however, given that some of the studies did not have enough information to calculate an effect size, this number was further refined to 106. The interventions included law, official sanction/fine, regulatory policy, multiple treatments, and nonpunitive action by regulatory agency. However, it is important to note that the meta-analysis was unable to report results for nonpunitive sanctions.
Two types of effect sizes were calculated, including 1) the standardized mean-difference effect size (ES-D), which was used for analyses comparing two groups’ performance on a continuous outcome; and 2) the product-moment correlation effect size (ES-R), which was used for relationships in which both the independent variable and dependent variable are continuous. To calculate effect sizes based on a more homogenous group of studies, effect sizes were also calculated for treatment type (law, punitive sanction, regulatory policy, other sanction, and multiple treatments), the unit of analysis (individual-level offending, company-level offending, geographic-area offending rates, or other units of analysis) and time ordering (cross-sectional, longitudinal, and both cross-sectional and longitudinal). However, it is important to note that the authors were unable to evaluate the effect of law on individual offending. The final number of effect sizes that were calculated for ES-D was 42; the final number of effect sizes calculated for ES-R was 76.
For the purposes of this review, all outcomes were analyzed across cross-sectional studies. Cross-sectional studies offer the ability to compare different variables at the same time (Institute for Work & Health 2015).
Although the meta-analysis evaluated whether or not the effects varied by the unit of analysis (e.g., corporations vs. individuals), for the purposes of this review only corporate-level outcomes were analyzed.
These sources were used in the development of the practice profile:
Simpson, Sally S., Melissa Roriet, Mariel Alper, Natalie Schell-Busey, William S. Laufer, and N. Craig Smith. 2014. Corporate Crime Deterrence: A Systematic Review. The Campbell Collaboration.
https://www.campbellcollaboration.org/library/corporate-crime-deterrence-systematic-review.htmlThese sources were used in the development of the practice profile:
Braithwaite, J. 1984. Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Institute for Work & Health (IWH). 2015. What Researchers Mean by Cross-Sectional vs. Longitudinal Studies. Accessed October 29, 2015:
http://www.iwh.on.ca/wrmb/cross-sectional-vs-longitudinal-studiesSetting (Delivery): Other Community Setting, Workplace
Practice Type: General deterrence, Specific deterrence
Unit of Analysis: Other